Against the historical backdrop of the codification debate in nineteenth century Germany, this article traces the reassertion of 'legal science' as an autonomous source of European legal integration in current legal and political discourse about the harmonization of European private law. The article argues that a grasp of widely shared ideas about the role and function of legal science and legal scientists is vital both towards an understanding of the extraordinary impact of the academic project of a European civil code on legal and political discourse in the Union in particular and towards furthering the theory of legal fields in general.
Introduction
Is legal science a source of European legal integration? The question may seem absurd to the readership of this journal. After all, "there is no Wissenschaft at common law!" (Legrand 1997, 54) . And social scientists concerned with the majestic role that law has played in the construction of Europe conceive of legal integration not as an autonomous legal process, but as a function of something else -political interests, social mobility or economic exchange, or some combination of these (Alter 2001 , Stone Sweet and Fligstein 2002 , Stone Sweet 2004 . My claim in this regard is fairly modest: law is more than a mere conveyer belt of 'something else' -the legal field is thicker than that. And the way in which lawyers conceive of themselves and of their profession goes to the heart of the vital question of how the legal field maintains both its autonomy and its authority (Bourdieu 1987, Madsen and Dezalay 2002) . There is a long and proud European history of legal scientists elevating themselves to the lofty heights of lawgiving and nation-building -a history that has been repeating itself in the process of European legal integration in general and is doing so with particular clarity in the current debates over the harmonization of European private law. As Jürgen Basedow notes approvingly, "legal scholars transcend the traditional limits of the analysis of legal development and try to shape the future European law themselves." (Basedow 1998, 125) This is not, however, the legal science of building conceptual heavens accessible only to those who drink themselves into forgetfulness of terrestrial human affairs (Cohen 1935) . This is a legal science that seeks, through a cluster of intellectual, social and political practices, to bolster its claims of authority by claiming to embody, represent and further some profound historic and Kent Academic Repository -http://kar.kent.ac.uk The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com -3 -cultural sense of 'European-ness' that lives on in 'the people.' In European law generally, this claim has long manifested itself in two interrelated but distinguishable strands of dominant legal thought (Schepel 2004a) . One is essentially ideological, and defines 'European legal culture' as law-as-science. The idea here is that one of the underlying structural similarities between different societies in the Union is a culture associated with 'the rule of law': the authority of general abstract rules, administered by legal experts under exclusion of laypeople, and the systematization of law by legal science. Abstraction, legalism, and amor intellectualis: these are not mere features of a particular legal system in a particular stage of historical development, they are constitutive of the very identity of Europe (Guterman 1966 , Wieacker 1990 , Häberle 1994 . The second strand is evolutionary and is a variation on basic Weberian themes: as society evolves inevitably to liberal capitalism, law evolves inevitably to law-as-science. Capitalism presupposes rational social action which in turn presupposes a calculable legal system and administration bound to rational rules of law: formal legal rationality replaces substantive legal rationality (Weber 1978) . Crafted and administered by a highly specialized legal profession, law detaches itself from its socio-cultural (and national) grounding and becomes amenable to the universally applicable best solution. The European Union and its legal framework here play the role of a rationalizing force, liberating civil society and the market from the shackles of political parochialism and legal nationalism (Schepel and Wesseling 1997, Bach 1999 ).
These themes are reinforced spectacularly in the intellectual foundations, social construction and political support structure of the project of a European civil code.
Kent Academic Repository -http://kar.kent.ac.uk The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com -4 -However unlikely it is at this stage that such a code will be enacted anytime soon, the enterprise behind it has been a startling success by almost any other measure.
It has involved the rapid establishment and expansion of a whole new field of academic enquiry, a remarkably influential effort at political agenda-setting, and a healthy success rate in attracting public funding. This article seeks to trace the importance of the assertion of 'legal science' in the construction and maintenance of the field of European private law both internally and externally. Though my lack of sympathy for the project should be obvious enough, the purpose here is not to discuss the merits of the idea of a European civil code or indeed of the 'softer'
options of private law harmonization now on the table: the aim of this article is simply to provide some insight into the import of the notion of a European brotherhood of lawyers united by a profound common attachment to 'scientific truth' in the framework of a particular legal field.
I. Legal Science and the German Civil Code
The logical historical reference point for the field of European private law is the intellectual and political history of the German civil code in the nineteenth century (John 1989 , Whitman 1990 , not least because it arguably represents the heyday of the political importance of legal scientists (Vogenauer 2005) . In truth, the import of this history in current legal thought is usually reduced to one aspect of it, the exchange between two eminent scholars, Thibaut and Savigny, on the desirability of enacting a civil code for the whole of fragmented Germany. Anton Thibaut considered such a possible codification as "the most beautiful gift from heaven" the German people could receive, achieving two things at once in the real world: on Juristenrecht is mere customary law, drawing its authority from external sources. Gierke 1898). The debate over the issues of social justice of private law was eventually settled by a series of compromises, and most notably by the rather extensive use of separate pieces of 'social' legislation as a quid pro quo for the 
II. The Enterprise of European Private Law
It would be hard to think of an area of law in the Member States of the European Union today that is more firmly rooted in national cultures and academic traditions and more impenetrable to outsiders for its idiosyncratic conceptual and technical sophistication than private law. And yet, it would be harder still to find an academic The CFR is to provide a common vocabulary and assist arbitrators, courts, national legislators, and the Community legislator in their work (Staudenmayer 2002 (Staudenmayer , 2005 The European Council has very recently admitted the sorry state of this legislation, calling for its quality and coherence to be improved by "measures of consolidation, codification and rationalization." xxii For European private lawyers, however, this way of tinkering with EC legislation largely misses the point. To merely concentrate on the ignorance of 'Brussels' in matters of private law is, in this view, to overlook the systemic problems posed by European law. The quality and coherence of national systems of private law is not something that 'better' piecemeal legislation can ultimately maintain: it is something that only a truly European science of private law can guarantee.
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IV. The Role of Legal Science in European Private Law Discourse
The CFR would seem to have settled, for the time being at least, the "Thibaut v.
Savigny" debate in European private law (Lando 1992 (Lando , 1997 (Lando , 2000 Kötz 2002; Basedow 2004) . The role of Savigny, with particular fondness for Roman law and all, has been taken on with pride and zeal by Reinhard Zimmermann. The great codifications of the nineteenth century, so he claims, are but "a transitional stage within an ongoing tradition" of European private law (Zimmermann 1995, 105) . In spite of the nationalization of law and legal science, it is still possible to find "common systematic, conceptual, institutional and ideological foundations" beneath the "bewildering diversity and specificity of our modern legal rules." (Zimmermann 1996, 600) But to uncover these we need a new historical legal science, and certainly not offerings from Brussels or Luxembourg: "Like Savigny, we should put our faith in an organically progressive science rather than the legislature."
(Zimmermann 1995, 105).
Zimmermann's ideas have attracted criticism from various sources, most notably and viciously perhaps from Ugo Mattei who accuses him of having the same "ethno-centric, conservative, class-privileged, self-serving attitude" as Savigny himself (Mattei 1998, 884) and of fighting a battle to avoid losing his status in the sociological shake-up of the European academic nomenklatura that would inevitably be the result of the creation of the Code:
"All of this can be avoided if the issue of codification is constructed as academic and if it is maintained within a highly homogeneous
European legal academic elite (a sort of old boys club) who, rather appealingly, argue to close the gates and defeat the Brussels Kent Academic Repository -http://kar.kent.ac.uk The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com -16 -Eurocrats. However, the real agenda is different. In avoiding the political process, which is less homogeneous and less pluralistic than legal academia, some legal scholars are more likely to keep their role of hidden lawgivers." (Mattei 1998, 886) What the Common Frame of Reference provides is a way to alter the terms of engagement in the debate from 'politics versus academia' to 'top down versus bottom up.' However pluralistic and non-elitist the Community legislator may be, very few people in Europe today would entrust it with a "forward-looking exercise in social engineering like the building of a common law of Europe." (Mattei 1998, 890) The role of legal science, then, is not as a handmaiden to the powers that be, nor (Collins 1995; Lequette 2002 Lequette , 2003 . Its detractors, then, claim that harmonization of private law will produce "a new separation between the legal-political function and social life." (Legrand 1997 (Legrand , 53, 1996 . European private lawyers sometimes react with irritation to these objections. Basedow speaks of "the strange ideology shared by so many lawyers all over the world that law is deeply rooted in the culture of each nation and as such unfit for international uniformity." (Basedow 1998, 127) Substance and procedure, however, are inexorably linked in European private law science.
V. Conclusion
The project of a European civil code is legitimized on the one hand by its scientific sophistication -and isolation from 'political' pressure -and on the other hand by Kent Academic Repository -http://kar.kent.ac.uk The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com -20 -grand historic theorizing about the common legal heritage of Europe and sociological claims about the cultural, social and political functions of private law science in society. Indeed, the fundamental move behind the enterprise is the collapse of these two strands of legitimization discourse. Intellectually, these ideas may or may not be taken seriously. Sociologically, they need to be understood as important means to maintain the unity, autonomy and hence the authority of the legal field. And that, in turn, should enable us better to grasp the extent to which European integration is a legal process.
